A Nervous Rex Judicata

Here is another in my series of cases that prove that absurd facts lead to absurd results.

At a Christmas party last year, Felix Navidad didn’t watch his dog Rex carefully, and the pup got into the rum punch which was sitting on a low table. He drank too much and became punch drunk. Felix decided that he would have to take the strangely behaving Rex to vet, so he wrestled the dog into the car.

Rex was sitting forlornly with one paw over his eyes on the front seat emitting a low growling noise while visions of pink elephants danced in his dogie cranium. While the car was stopped at a light, the dog suddenly emitted a loud bark, and jumped onto the floor of the vehicle. He landed on the gas pedal and propelled the car due south, into the car of a driver also stopped at the light.

When Constable Frazier arrived he was told of poor Rex’s stupor, and he proceeded to issue Rex three tickets, one for Driving While Intoxicated, a second for Driving without a license, and finally a summons for not wearing a seat belt.

The case came to be heard in the Nouveau Riche on Hudson Justice Court before Judge Riesa Judy Catto. Rex’s attorney Arnold Handover, of Handover Fistt L.L.P., first addressed an interesting issue. "Rex" he noted, is Greek for "king." Therefore, he posited that Rex possessed sovereign immunity-- a doctrine based upon the ancient assumption that the King could do no wrong." ["Rex Non Potest Peccare” as the 18th century Oxford jurist, Sir William Blackstone put it, which in English translates: “The Sovereign [i.e., Rex] can do no wrong.”] As the eminent scholar Mel Brooks observed, "It's good to be the king."

Judge Cotto scoffed. She asked rhetorically, "Then why did Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. famously sit in the Birmingham jail--he was a King, wasn't he?" She confessed to not being able to understand how the ancient doctrine could apply in America at all. Not only do we have no king, she remarked, having fought an entire war to rid ourselves of a monarch, we have a tripartite government. We have three branches of government so that each can, (like a game of rock, paper, scissors) keep the others in check. If none of them could do anything wrong, why do they have the power to constantly check the other branches like a zealous hockey defenseman?

Next, Handover addressed the query:" Must dogs wear seat belts?"

Rex was not in the driver's seat of the vehicle, and at best the dog might be described as a passenger, he noted. New York's Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1213 (2) does require passengers to wear seat belts and shoulder harnesses. But it is the only section in the the entire Vehicle and Traffic Law that uses the word "passenger" (as opposed to "occupant" a word employed elsewhere in the statute). So Handover looked to case law for a definition of "passenger." The only decisions were in railroad negligence cases, discussing the duties owed to various classes of people on that mode of transportation--case law that made the distinction between a mere trespasser and someone who paid for his passage -- a "passenger." (Hopkins v. Long Island R.R., 233 NY 9). Handover argued that Rex did not pay for his passage, and hence was not a "passenger;" and, therefore was not required to be restrained. However, when Justice Catto heard that argument, she had to be restrained.

Next was the issue of "driving." Frazier had charged Rex because case law defines operation of a vehicle as including any action to put the vehicle into motion--and pressing down on the gas pedal is certainly such an action. But Handover argued that the action needs to be an intentional action, noting that a case in which the clutch of a vehicle was unintentionally manipulated found no "operation" occurred under the DWI laws (People v. Edwards, 158 Misc. 2d 615).

While the state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion, Lord Bowen remarked in Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 L.R. [Ch. D. 1885] 459 at 483; and a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts (People v. Lieberman, 3 NY2d 649), the same may not be said for canines. Justice W.F. Allen sitting in Oneida County Court in 1856 remarked in Wiley v. Slater (22 Barber 506) " [t]he courtesies and hospitalities of dog life cannot be well regulated by the judicial tribunals of the land." Courts are similarly ill equipped to determine the motivations of most canines. In other words, there are plenty of "reasonable man" cases you can find in the law reports, but try to find a "reasonable dog" case when you need one.

The driving without a license charge was easily disposed of--Rex had a dog license (Agriculture & Markets Law § 109.) It did not authorize him to operate a motor vehicle (and he was under age--even in dog years), however the law only forbids persons to drive vehicles without a license or under the influence of alcohol. There is no section of the law that prohibits dogs from operating vehicles. Justice Catto urged the Legislature to close that loophole in her decision dismissing the case.